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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16441

-vsRONhLD RAY HERZOG,
Defendant-Appellant.

3RIIF OF RESPONDENT

~;~ella~t

Kas convicted of th2

::Le r:-,:c:::-6 0-..iC:ic_:_al Dis-crict Court,

cri~e

of rape in

in and for Salt Lake

Countc', State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
presiding.

=::::s::osrno::

I'J THE LO'.:ER CO'JFT

After appellant's conviction he was sentenced
::o ::
and

::er~
~as

of one ::c fifteen years in the

Uta~

State Prison

placed on probation on condition that he serve

six months in the Salt Lake County Jail.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the judgment
rencered by the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Al though respondent is in substantial agreement
with appellant's statement of facts, one discrepancy
one material omission merit comment.

a~

First, appellant's

assertion thac: the prosecutrix made no attempt to flee
is erroneous.

Under direct and cross-examination the

prosecutrix testified that she attempted to get out of

t~

truck but her effort was thwarted by appellant (T.45,67,
76,79).
~as

The prosecutrix's description of the incident

=orrobora~ed

::~2:=::.:u-:.ri::
qra~bing

">:al!;

t~-ir=:C.

by appellant who testified tnat the
"":.c

~scape

jer and telling

but he

~er

tnat she

c:ee~~~ied

t~at

~as

her b~·

not going to

In addition,

(T.2.12,L3,2.23,L>~,l25,123).

prosecu~rix

s~c?ped

she could

~ot

~'.12

have escaped

when she exited the truck to remove her clothing because
appellant also stepped out of the truck, effectively
blocking tje onl; avenue of escape

(T.~6,67,79).

SeccnC:,

testimony of both the prosecutrix and appellant indicates

rr,ec: with piys~cal res~raint and threats by appellant did
the prosecutrix refrain from making further attempts
to escape.

The prosecutrix stated that she acquiesced ~

appellant's demand out of fear.
provoking

hi~

an~

bei~g

hilrt

She was frightened of

(T.45,~G,78,79).
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I

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
WAS SUFFICIENT FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO
HAVE FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Utah Supreme Court enunciated the standard
by which it will review jury findings to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence presented at
trial to sustain a conviction.

In State v. Allgood,

28 Utah 2d 119, 499 P. 2d 269 (1972), the Court stated:
. to set aside a jury verdict
the evi6ence must appear so inconclusive
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds
ac::ing fairly upon it must have entertained
reaso~able doubt that the defendant
cc::-~--._:_ ::::ed L1e cri::ie.
S:ce c.lso State ·v. '.!ills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211 (1952);
State v. Sullivan,

6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957); State

v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960); State v.
:.\iEs,
21~

530 P.2d 1272 ((.)tc_h 19T5); State y. Romero, 554 P.2C.

(Utah 1976).

assumes that the Jury believed that which supports its
verdict.

State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 }Utah 1976).

With

this principle in mind it is necessary to examine the
State's evidence to isolate those inconsistencies which
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would compel reversal of the guilty verdict.
is easily disposed of because there are none.

This task
The

prosecutrix's description of the incident is internally
consistent and substantially corroborated by appellant's
testimony.

The prosecutrix's avowal of fear of physical

abuse is reasonable in light of appellant's threat of
violence and physical restraint of her at such a desolate
locale so late at night.

The appellant himself admitted

that he forced the prosecutrix to comply with his demand
a!1ci i:o):pressed rec:cret and fear of the possible consequences
of his behavior
conc~~siveness

(2xhibit 1-P).

The coherence a!1d

of the State's case

de~onstra~~

~~a~

t~ 2

jury's verdict is Kell founded.
POINT II
THE JURY PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
PROSECUTRIX'S RESISTANCE WAS SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH RAPE.
The s-:.a:-idard o:: rcsistar,ce suffici·2nt to

nega~e

consent in a charge of rape was established by the Utah

Criminal Code, Section 76-5-406(1) and (2):
Sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual
abuse without consent of victim .
Circumstances . . . An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual abuse is without
consent of the victim under the following
circuns~ances:

(1)
When the actor compels the victim to
or participate b~ force that ov0rcon~s
such earnest resistance as miaht rc~son~bl~
sub~it
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(2) The actor compels the victim to
sub'.Tli"': or participate by any threat that wculd
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary
resolution.
Appellant contends that a verbal threat does not
rise

to the level of force necessary to negate consent.

Appellant asserts this argument despite the clear language
of Section 76-5-406(2), which states that submission may be
compelled by threat alone if such threat would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.
State v.

See also

Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 (1976).
Since the trial court properly instructed the jury

regarding the applicable law, the question here to be
resolved is whether the jury could find that appellant's
-::~reat

prevented resistance by the prosecutrix.

insists that
~uestion

~he

Su?re~e

in Sta-::e v.

Appellant

Court has already answered this

Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 3&4 P.2d 109

(1961), when it found that the prosecutrix made no effort to
escape and sustained no injury, and thus "her claim that
consent had been obtained by force or fear was not substan-::·::_a-::eci

}::;~-the

=··icie:~ce''

(?,p~:·c::Cla:-:c::'s

Brief, p.

5).

Appella;~t

conveniently overlooks these facts of the Horne case which
C~ur-::'s

a-::-::en-::::_on:

During the three hour period defendant
was in her bedroom the prosecutrix made no
outcry.
This despite the fact that all doc;>rs
and windows were open and there were occupied
trailers within 20 to 30 feet from hers.
The prosecutrix did not attempt to leave the
trailer to seek help although she had ample
opportunity.
. There was no evi~ence of marks
or bruises upon either party.
This after an
alleged struggle which lasted three hours.
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Acpellant's comparison is strained indeed.

True, the

prosecutrix in the instant case made no outcry; but unlike
the Horne si tua ti on, no one was in the vicinity to hear her
cries.

True, the prosecutrix in the instant case made no

attempt to escape after her first attempt was thwarted; but
unlike the Horne situation, she had no further opDortunitv
to flee.

\·Jhen the orosecutrix got out of the truck to remove

her clothing, so also did appellant.

Moreover, the isolated

location provided an insurmountable obstacle to escape.
True, the prosecutrix in the instant case was not injured or
brcise:'.; cc::t c::nli'ze ti'!e Horne situation, she did
~a~e

s~rugcle~

aga~nst

:JCJi:

claim to

ancellant because of the great Fear

i:1l!ere:J.tl:,' L';::rci::acle as to be 'Jnworthv of belief."

Id. at L

Finally, appellant argues that the Utah Supreme
Court decisions which affirm race convictions involve force

distinguished from Horne and from the instant case.

bu

apcellan~

is without merit.

RevieH

Once again apcellant has

rnisreoresented the thrust of the Court's opinions by focusi~
on the ~uanturn of ohysical force emoloyed by defendants

rather than considering the Court's rationale for its decisio~'
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In State v. Nune~. 520 P.2d 881 (Utah 1974), the court
statec:
Othe~ than pleading and crying, the
prosecutrix offered li~tle physical
resistance, but she did testify that she
greatly feared physical abuse from the
defendant and his companions should she
resist .
. there is nothing to indicate
that the prosecutrix consented or that
her conduct would tend to create the
impression in the mind of the defendant
that the prosecutrix had in fact consented.

Id. at 882.

Contrary to appellant's contention, the Nunez

case

respondent's position.

·- -

s~cports

-

-

- - - - - -

a~~

-- -·

c:_ -,

had teen fearfcl of the

:~e

dra

During the trial of the

o~ly

inference

~hich

~ossible

ca~

be

from this admission of regret is that at the time he

had intercourse with the prosecutrix appellant realized that
T~is

infe~ence

is fortified bv apcellant's

statev..ent to police that he "forced" the prosecutrix to have

~poel:ant also cites State v.

Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah

as distinguishable from State v. Horne, supra, and from

197 4) ,

the instant case because Mr. Studham used physical force to
o~erco~e

his victim .

That credence in such a distinction is

...~~:=·-=_c.-:-:::::_~ i~ cb'·ious :ro:r t~e Stu,:3.~ai:"'. decision itself.
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In

. a sounder view is recognized
that bruising and terrorizinq of the
senses and sensibilities can be just as
real and just as wrong as the beating ~nd
bruising of the flesh; and that the
law should afford a woman protection, not onl\·
from Physical violence, but from having
her feelings and sensibilities outraged
bv force or fear in violation of what she
is entitled to regard and protect as the
integrity of her person. Accordingly, in
deterrining whether the victim's will
and resistance were overcome, it is appropriate to consider that this may be
accomplished by either physical force
and violence or by psychological or
emotional stress imposed upon her.
Id. at 702

(emn~asis

added).

-~=ter

appellant threatened violence, the prosecutrix atteDoted

~

flee, but was physically restrained by appellant who stated
she

~ould

not be

~armed

i~

she

subm~t.

psychological stress was imcosed on her did the prosecutrix

physical and psychological force sufficient to negate
consent.
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CONCLUSION
The law requires evidence of resistance "as might
reasonably be expected under the circumstances" to support
a conviction of rape.

The question to be resolved with

respect to sufficiency of the evidence is not whether a
reasonable doubt may have existed, but whether a reasonable
doubt is compelled by the evidence.

Only under such cir-

cumstances should a jury verdict be reversed.

In this case,

t'1e e'.'idence clearlv demonstrates reasonable resistance by
the

~rosecutrix,

=es~cn~ent
cour~

and therefore the jury verdict should stand.

urges that this Court affirm the ruling of the trial

fin~ina

a~oellant

auilty of rape.
Rescectfull~

sub~itted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT R. i'IALLACE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys· fer Respondent
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